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COMMENTS
PLAYING OUTSIDE THE JOINTS:
WHERE THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT MEETS TITLE VII
AMANDA BRENNAN*
As the nation is grappling with rancorous identity wars, some are looking to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as both a shield and sword.
What was once a permissible federal religious accommodation has become an
impermissible religious endorsement. This Comment argues that the Supreme
Court's recent expansion of RFRA, as applied to Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, violates the Establishment Clause. RFRA not only provides
employers immunity from Title VII, it allows employers to utilize the judiciary
to coerce lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) employees to conform to the
employers’ religious beliefs. In providing employers religious exemptions from
Title VII, the judiciary coerces religious conformance and endorses religion.
However blurred the boundaries of the Establishment Clause are, it clearly
prohibits such government action.
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INTRODUCTION
You just returned from your honeymoon with your new wife. You
are excited to get back to work, but when you arrive, you notice your
name is no longer outside of your office and your key does not fit in
the lock. You go to the Vice President to demand answers. He tells
you that both his faith in God and the Christian Bible have taught him
that marriage is between a man and a woman. He cannot, in
accordance with his faith, let you, the closeted lesbian who has helped
build this company, continue to be a part of his team. You are fired.
After a few days of shock, you file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). You claim that the
company unlawfully discriminated against you, and therefore violated
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The EEOC investigates your case
and finds reasonable cause to believe the company unlawfully
discriminated against you. After months of investigating, the EEOC
files a suit against the company. At trial, the company argues that
requiring it to retain a homosexual employee violates its sincerely held
religious beliefs. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),1 the company should be exempt from Title VII’s prohibition
on employment discrimination. At the end of the trial, the court holds
that requiring the company to maintain you as an employee violates
the company’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Further, because the
EEOC failed to show that requiring the company maintain you as an
employee is the least burdensome recourse, the company is exempt
from Title VII. You lost.
While the scenario above is hypothetical, it is far from conjectural.
RFRA prevents the government from substantially burdening a
person’s religious exercise2 unless the government can pass strict
scrutiny by demonstrating: (i) it has a compelling interest in applying
the law to the person, and (ii) it is using the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest.3 Therefore, if a federal statute or regulation
substantially burdens an individual’s religious exercise, even if
unintentionally, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny or it must
exempt the individual from the burdensome statute or regulation.4

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).
2. See § 2000bb-1(a) (“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”).
3. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2).
4. § 2000bb-1(c); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2761 (stating that “[i]f the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of
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In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court held that the
judiciary is not capable of measuring the substantiality of the burden a
government action has on religious exercise.6 Rather, courts can only
inquire into whether the religious objector honestly believes that the
government is substantially burdening his religious exercise.7 Further,
the Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations are “person[s]”
under RFRA, whose religious exercise RFRA therefore protects.8
The Hobby Lobby decision represents an extreme expansion of
religious liberty. First, by deeming itself incompetent to decide
whether the government substantially burdened religious exercise, the
Court eliminated the threshold question used to determine whether
strict scrutiny should be applied.9 So long as a person honestly believes
the government is burdening his religious exercise, strict scrutiny must
apply.10 Additionally, by expanding RFRA protections to corporations,
the Court effectively provided exemptions from laws specifically
designed to circumscribe corporate power and protect individuals
from harmful corporate conduct.11
This directly implicates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,12 which
prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against
employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;13
religion, under the [RFRA] that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule”
(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997))).
5. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6. See id. at 2779 (announcing that the “narrow function” of the Court in
analyzing RFRA issues is to determine whether the line drawn between the religious
belief and objectionable act reflects an “honest conviction” (quoting Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))).
7. Id.
8. See id. at 2768–75 (rejecting both the argument that closely held for-profit
corporations are not “people,” and the argument that corporations do not have the
ability to exercise religion).
9. The word “substantially” was added to clarify that the compelling interest test
should only be applied to government actions that substantially burden religious
exercise. See 139 CONG. REC. 26180 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“It does not require
the Government to justify every action that has some effect on religious exercise.”).
Thus, whether RFRA applies depends on whether the government substantially
burdened religious exercise. For further discussion, see infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
11. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1458 (2015)
(arguing that the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby has ushered in an era of Free Exercise
Lochnerism, in which religious liberty is used as a conduit for corporate deregulation).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
13. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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and, is particularly relevant to claims of employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.14 Unlike race,
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) status is seen as a choice by
some judges,15 and even if it is not, the outward projection of this status
is partially within control of the employee. Therefore, rather than
requiring the employer to maintain a flamboyant LGBT employee, a
less restrictive alternative is to require the employee to present in a
more hetero-normative or cis-normative manner while at work.16
This Comment argues that applying RFRA, as construed by the
Supreme Court, to Title VII violates the Establishment Clause.17 Part I
reviews the evolution of religious accommodation under the Free
Exercise Clause,18 the recent expansion of religious accommodation
under RFRA, and the simultaneous expansion of LGBT protections.19
Additionally, Part I explores the inevitable clash between LGBT and
religious rights as exemplified in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc.20 Finally, Part I explores how the Court has traversed the
fine line between permissible religious accommodation under the Free
Exercise Clause and impermissible religious endorsement under the
Establishment Clause.21
Part II argues that applying RFRA, as construed by the Supreme
Court, to Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination constitutes a
government action that compels LGBT employees to conform to the
religious ideology of their employer, and therefore violates the

14. The EEOC has interpreted Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to also
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. See infra
Section I.C.
15. According to one judge, “[s]ome gay individuals adopt what various
commentators have referred to as the gay ‘social identity’ but experience a variety of
sexual desires.” Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor,
J., concurring) (citing E.J. Graff, What’s Wrong with Choosing to Be Gay?, THE NATION
(Feb. 3, 2014); Brandon Ambrosino, I Wasn’t Born This Way. I Choose to Be Gay, THE
NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2014)).
16. See infra Section II.A.2 (showing how Hobby Lobby ignored pre-Smith cases to
better protect employers over employees).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the federal government from establishing
a state religion).
18. Id. (reserving the right of citizens to accept any religious belief and engage in
any religious ritual); see infra Section I.A.
19. See infra Section I.C.
20. 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018),
petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018); see also infra Section I.D.
21. See infra Part I.
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Establishment Clause.22 Additionally, Part II argues that RFRA
accommodations from Title VII violate the fundamental principle of
neutrality23 and are therefore an impermissible endorsement.24 To
support these assertions, Part II analyzes the application of RFRA to
Title VII by examining the Harris Funeral Homes decision.25 This
Comment concludes that the Establishment Clause provides a natural
limit to the Court’s broad expansion of religious freedom under RFRA,
and applying RFRA to Title VII exceeds this limitation.26
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Free Exercise Clause and Religious Accommodation
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”27 Though the First Amendment specifically refers to Congress,
it restricts all three branches, including the judiciary, from infringing on
these rights.28 Thus, if any branch acts beyond its authority by
burdening an individual’s religious exercise, that individual may seek
exemption from the unjustified imposition.29
The Free Exercise Clause protects only beliefs and practices that are
religious, and that protection is not infallible. This Section explains
what protections are afforded under the Free Exercise Clause.
Section I.A.1 explores the Court’s rules for determining whether a
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. See infra notes 215–221 (explaining accommodations must be neutral, neither
favoring one religious over another, nor favoring religion generally).
24. See infra Section II.A.
25. See infra Section II.A.2.
26. See infra Conclusion.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. As Justice Black eloquently explained:
[t]he amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers
granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before
in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original
Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could
abridge the people’s freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly.
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); see also 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (explaining
that the purpose of favoring particular rights within the Constitution is to “limit and qualify
the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode”).
29. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963) (providing religious
exemption from a state’s employment benefit law).
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belief or practice is religious. Section I.A.2 explains what restrictions
on religious exercise are permissible under the Free Exercise Clause.
This Section begins by delineating the Court’s incongruent Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence leading up to its seminal decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,30 where it held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require the government to provide religious
accommodation from neutral, generally applicable laws.31 The Section
concludes by clarifying what restrictions are permissible post-Smith.
1. Defining religious exercise
The Free Exercise Clause protects two rights: “the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires” and the right to
perform, or abstain from performing, physical acts engaged in for
religious reasons.32 The right to believe is absolute, but the right to act
is not.33 Thus, the government may not compel an individual to
subscribe to a particular religious tenet; however, in some circumstances
30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
31. Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 878.
32. Id. at 877.
33. At the time of ratification, both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
recognized that the right to free exercise was not absolute. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (explaining that none of the
proposed amendments, including what is now the First Amendment, should be
construed as limitations on other protected rights); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Danbury Baptist Association, 1 January 1802, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=danbury%20baptists&s=1111311111&r=5
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (expressing his understanding that under the recently ratified
First Amendment, “the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, [and] not
opinions” and, therefore, no citizen has any right superior to his social duties). Early
cases recognized the power of government to regulate conduct in order to protect
society. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (noting that states may
enact nondiscriminatory laws to “safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the
community”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (illustrating that if
the government were unable to regulate religious conduct, it would have no authority
to protect against individuals who believe their religion to require human sacrifice or
suicide). Though religious belief is protected under the Free Exercise Clause, the
early cases suggest that this protection derived from the Establishment Clause. See Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (noting that in of all the cases brought
before the Court in the previous ten years, the Court consistently held that the
Establishment Clause withdrew all legislative power respective of religious belief);
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303–04 (explaining that between the two objectives of the First
Amendment—preventing the government from compelling individuals to accept and
practice any religion, and protecting the freedom to practice a chosen religion—the
freedom to practice may be regulated by the government “for the protection of society”).
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the government may prohibit him from acting in accordance with the
particular religious tenets to which he does subscribe.34
Whether belief or conduct, the Free Exercise Clause protects only
those that are religious.35 Because the right to religious belief is
absolute, the Supreme Court has proceeded cautiously in rejecting an
individual’s claim that his beliefs are religious,36 giving great deference
to the individual.37
While there is no clear definition of religion, the Supreme Court has
established some standards that guide the determination of whether a
particular belief or action is religious.38 First, the Free Exercise Clause
protects beliefs not associated with a god or any established religion so
long as they occupy the same place in the life of the religious objector
as would an orthodox belief in god.39 Further, if a person’s beliefs are

34. See Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 877, 879 (noting that the First Amendment excludes
government regulation of religious beliefs, but rejecting the contention that a person’s
religious conduct must be excluded from such regulation).
35. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
36. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (emphasizing that the
“determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to constitutional
protection . . . present[s] a most delicate question”).
37. See Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition
of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 160 (1982) (asserting that defining “religion” is a
classification problem whereby “any definition inevitably will exclude some activities
from protected status” and, therefore, risk violating the Establishment Clause); Sharon
L. Worthing, “Religion” and “Religious Institutions” Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPP. L. REV.
313, 345–46 (1980) (arguing that giving the government power to define what
constitutes a “church” would violate the Establishment Clause by empowering the
government to create a definition that discriminates against disfavored religions and
religious minorities); see also Sandy Levinson, Justice Ginsburg’s Inexplicable First Two Pages,
BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2014), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/justiceginsburgs-inexpecable-first-two.html (“‘Because this is the way I feel seems to be a
conclusive argument in the religions realm . . . .”).
38. Some of these guidelines stem from the Court’s attempt to construct a
permissible statutory definition of religion, while others reflect the Court’s
understanding that it is incompetent to appraise the religiosity of a claimed belief. See
infra notes 39–51 and accompanying text.
39. In Unites States v. Seeger, the Court was called upon to construe § 6 (j) of the
Military Training and Service Act (MTSA), which exempts from combat training
“persons who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form.” 380 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1965). MTSA
defined “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code.” Id. at 165 (alteration in original). The Court held that, under
MTSA, the test to determine whether a belief is “in relation to a Supreme Being,” and
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associated with an established religion, the person’s religious beliefs
do not have to align with the dominant views of his religion.40 To hold
otherwise would require courts to determine whose perception of the
religious commands are correct, a task entirely outside of the judicial
function and competency.41 Second, courts may not question the truth
or verity of religious doctrines or beliefs; rather, courts may only
question whether the belief is sincerely held.42
Finally, courts may not question whether religious beliefs are
reasonable.43 In Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division,44 Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, challenged the denial of his
unemployment benefits under the Free Exercise Clause.45 Thomas was
assigned to work in the production of turrets for military tanks.46 When
he realized the turrets would be used in war, Thomas ultimately quit,
claiming that contributing to the production of weapons violated his
religion.47 At an administrative hearing, Thomas testified that he
believed that he could work in the production of raw material that
might ultimately be used for the production of tanks without violating
is therefore religious, is whether such belief is “sincere and meaningful [and] occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.” Id. at 165–66. In his concurrence,
Justice Douglas explained that the Court’s’ interpretation brings MTSA in line with
the Free Exercise Clause, intimating that the First Amendment protects sincere beliefs
not associated with a God or any established religion, so long as they occupy the same
place in the life of the objector as would an orthodox belief in God. See id. at 188, 192–
93 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16 (“[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited
to beliefs which are shared by all members of a religious sect.”); see also Frazee v. Ill.
Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (accepting an individual’s objection to
working on Sundays as religious, even though others of his and similar religions did
not have such a proscription).
41. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (holding that the function of the court is to find if the
terminated worker had an honest religious conviction, not to act as arbiters of
scriptural interpretation).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits a jury from determining the truth or veracity of religious beliefs
or doctrines, but allowing the jury to determine whether respondent well knew their
proffered religious beliefs were false).
43. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“[T]he resolution of that question is not to turn
upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment protection.”).
44. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
45. Id. at 710.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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his religious precepts because he would not be contributing directly to
the war.48 The Indiana Supreme Court found Thomas’s religious
beliefs to be inconsistent and, therefore, found his objection to be a
philosophical rather than a religious choice.49 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, finding that Thomas had drawn a line
between acceptable and unacceptable work based on his religious
beliefs. The Court concluded that it was not the judiciary’s role to
question whether the line drawn was reasonable.50 Instead, “[t]he
narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine
whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated
his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden
by his religion.”51 Thus, if a person claims his conduct is connected to
a religious belief, the reviewing court will most likely assent without
further inquiry.52
2. Permissible restriction on religious exercise
Prior to the 1990s, the Supreme Court struggled to elucidate any
clear boundaries of permissible government restrictions on religious
conduct.53 In earlier cases, the Court declined to strike down laws that
were generally applicable and neutral towards religion, notwithstanding
any burden on religious exercise.54 In later cases, the Court
determined whether a law substantially burdened religious exercise;55
if it did, the Court applied some form of interest balancing test.56
In early cases, the Court did not subject a challenged law to any form
of scrutiny if it found that the law was generally applicable and
religiously neutral.57 The Court was not concerned with the burden

48. Id. at 710–11.
49. Id. at 714–15.
50. Id. at 715.
51. Id. at 716.
52. See Levinson, supra note 37.
53. See William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 549–57 (1983) (discussing the Court’s inconsistent decisions in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, United States v. Lee, Sherbert v. Verner, and Braunfeld v. Brown).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 57–58.
55. See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–68 (1944) (denying
religious exemptions for portions of state’s child labor laws); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (striking down a statute targeting religious solicitation but
recognizing that if the statute simply targeted solicitation in general, there would be
no constitutional claim); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–67 (1878)
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on individual religious exercise. Instead, it focused on the detriment
that mandatory religious accommodations would impose on the
government and society.58
Over time, the Court shifted its concern from the broad detriment
to society to the individual burden on religious exercise.59 If the Court
found that a law substantially burdened religious exercise, it used strict
scrutiny to balance the government’s interest against the individual’s
interests.60 A law burdened religious exercise if it criminalized or
penalized specific religious conduct.61 A law only indirectly or
incidentally burdened religious exercise if it merely made religious
observance more difficult or did not require the religious objector to
engage in the violative conduct himself.62
Thus, the government substantially burdened religious exercise
when it denied unemployment benefits to an individual who quit his

(denying religious accommodation from neutral, generally applicable statutes
criminalizing polygamy).
58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 (“To permit this [exemption] would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in
name under such circumstances.”).
59. Compare id. at 166–67 (denying religious accommodations because the
accommodations could prevent the government from maintaining order), with
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (granting religious accommodation after
finding that mandatory school attendance would “substantially interfer[e]” with Amish
students’ religious development).
60. See infra notes 63–78 and accompanying text.
61. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981)
(“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion
may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.”).
62. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 447, 449
(1988) (recognizing the government’s actions would have severe adverse effects on
respondents’ religious practice but denying a religious exemption because the
government neither coerced respondents into violating their religious beliefs through
criminal sanctions nor “penalize[d] religious activity by denying . . . an equal share of
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens”); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 701 (1986) (holding that the government’s use of a social security number did
not impair the claimant’s ability to believe, express, or exercise his religion); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (“To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny,
legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e.,
legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.”).
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job because the job required that he violate his religious beliefs.63 The
state penalized the individual for adhering to his religious beliefs,
thereby placing upon him a substantial pressure to modify his
behavior.64 However, a law that required owners to close their
businesses on Sundays only indirectly burdened the religious exercise
of an owner whose religious beliefs required that he also close his
business on Saturdays.65 The law did not require the business owner
to engage in any behavior that his religion forbid; it simply made
religious observance more expensive.66 Additionally, conditioning the
receipt of food stamps upon permitting the government to create a
social security number only incidentally violated a Native American’s
religious belief that a social security number would “rob” his
daughter’s spirit.67 The government had not required that the Native
American create the spirit robbing number himself; rather, it merely
required that he allow the government to create the number.68
When the Court found that the government substantially burdened
religious exercise, it reviewed the government action under strict
scrutiny. The Court first applied strict scrutiny to laws burdening
religious exercise in Sherbert v. Verner.69 There, the Court reviewed
whether South Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying
unemployment benefits because an applicant refused to accept work

63. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717 (finding that the “employee was put to a choice
between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work”).
64. Id. at 717–18.
65. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606 (noting that the Sunday closing law “may well
result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs,” but finding
that this “is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to make a religious
practice itself unlawful”).
66. Id. at 605.
67. See Roy, 476 U.S. at 696, 706 (holding that the government’s use of a social
security number did not impair the claimant’s ability to believe, express, or exercise
his religion).
68. See id. (“[A] government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a
choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is
wholly different from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously
inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for
religious reasons.”). In this case, the Court also focused on the fact that the Free
Exercise Clause cannot be used to compel the government to conduct its own internal
affairs in accordance with the claimant’s religious beliefs. See id. at 709 (“Never to our
knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government
itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development . . . .”).
69. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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that required her to work on her Sabbath.70 The Court rejected the
state’s argument that it had a compelling interest in preventing
fraudulent claims of religious burden because the state had not raised
this interest before the South Carolina Supreme Court; however, the
Court noted that even if it were to accept this as a compelling state
interest, the state would have to “demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights.”71 The Court’s decision in Sherbert announced the
typical balancing test under strict scrutiny, which requires that the
government demonstrate that it has a compelling interest and that it
used the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.
In some cases, the Court applied a narrow compelling interest
analysis, under which it required the government to show that applying
the law to the individual religious objector served the government’s
compelling interest. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,72 three parents, members of
the Old Order Amish and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church,
challenged a Wisconsin law that mandated that children under the age
of sixteen attend school.73 The parents believed that sending their
children to high school was “contrary to the Amish way of life,” and
doing so would “endanger their own salvation and that of their
children.”74 The state argued that education was necessary to “preserve
freedom and independence” by ensuring citizens become “effective and
intelligent” participants in the political process and “self-reliant and selfsufficient participants in society.”75 The Court refused to accept this
general interest as sufficient justification for burdening the parents’
religious exercise.76 Instead, the Court examined the “impediment to
those objectives that would flow from recognizing” an exception for the
Amish.77 Because the government failed to demonstrate how an
exception for the Amish would prevent it from pursuing its interest, the
Court granted the parents a religious exemption.78
In other cases, the Court used a broader compelling interest analysis,
under which it permitted the government to justify a law by broadly
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 407.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 236.
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defining its compelling interests such that it required uniform
application.79 For example, in United States v. Lee,80 the Court found
that the government’s broad public interest in providing Social
Security insurance required uniform application of the Social Security
Tax.81 There, a member of the Older Order Amish challenged
compulsory participation in the social security tax system.82 He
claimed that giving or receiving public benefits through the social
security system would violate his Amish beliefs.83 The Court did not
question whether granting a religious exception in this case would
impede the government’s interest.84 Instead, the Court focused on the
effect of religious exemptions in the aggregate, and found that
permitting a “myriad [of] exceptions flowing from a wide variety of
religious beliefs” would inhibit the government’s ability to achieve its
compelling interest.85
In 1990, the Court simplified its analysis, creating a predictable and
uniform approach based on early Free Exercise Clause precedent. In
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require the government to provide religious
accommodation from neutral, generally applicable laws.86 The
majority expressed concern that subjecting neutral laws of general
applicability to strict scrutiny would foster anarchy by creating
79. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982) (focusing on the
broad public interest in providing Social Security insurance and the need for uniform
application as compelling); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961) (rejecting
appellants’ argument that an exemption for individuals whose religious convictions
require a different day of rest would still permit the state to achieve its compelling
interest in affording a uniform day of rest without burdening appellants’ religious
exercise—“to permit the exemption might well undermine the State’s goal of
providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise
and activity.”).
80. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
81. Id. at 258–60.
82. Id. at 254–55.
83. Id. at 259.
84. The Court inquired into whether permitting exemptions for the “Amish
belief” would interfere with the government’s ability to achieve its interest. Id. at 259.
Yet, the Court’s analysis focused on the harms that numerous religious exemptions
would pose to the tax system in general. See id. at 260 (denying a religious exemption
for the social security tax and reasoning that, because income taxes cannot be
separated into discrete obligations, allowing partial exemptions would frustrate the
general tax system as a whole).
85. Id. at 260.
86. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (denying religious exemption from Oregon’s
controlled substance law for the ceremonial ingestion of peyote).
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“constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of every conceivable kind.”87 This concern was premised on the
understanding that strict scrutiny must have the same meaning and
application as in other areas of constitutional law, and under this
uniform approach, many laws would fail.88 The majority distinguished
Smith from prior cases in which the Court applied the compelling
interest test to laws burdening a person’s religious exercise.89 Those
cases fell into two categories: (1) hybrid cases involving religious
exercise and another constitutionally protected right;90 and
(2) unemployment compensation cases in which the relevant statutes
created individual exemptions for individuals who quit or refused
available work for “good cause.”91
Thus, under the Free Exercise Clause, a law burdening religious
exercise will be subject to strict scrutiny only if it is not a neutral law of
general applicability.92 A law is not neutral if “the object . . . is to
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation.”93 A law is not generally applicable if it only prohibits
conduct when it is motivated by religious beliefs.94 Thus, most Free
Exercise claims will fail under Smith unless the government has
specifically targeted religion.95
87. Id. at 888–89.
88. See id. at 885–86, 888 (noting that, while applying strict scrutiny in the context of
laws based on race or laws regulating speech results in “equal[] treatment and the
unrestricted flow of speech,” applying strict scrutiny to all laws in the context of religious
exercise “would produce . . . a private right to ignore generally applicable laws”).
89. See id. at 881–84.
90. See id. at 881–82.
91. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (Burger, C.J.)).
92. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–
28, 542, 545–46 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a city ordinance that prohibited the ritual
sacrifice of animals because it was neither a neutral law nor a law of general applicability).
93. Id. at 533.
94. The Court declined to precisely define a standard for determining whether a law
is one of general applicability; however, its decision shed light on what might qualify. See
id. at 542–43 (“The Free Exercise Clause ‘protects religious observers against unequal
treatment,’ . . . and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental
interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a
religious motivation.” (citations omitted)). Further, this synthesis comports with the
interpretations of lower courts. See, e.g., Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 18
(1st Cir. 2004) (accepting the district court’s construction of general applicability as
prohibiting the government from selectively burdening religious conduct).
95. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019
(2017) (recognizing that under the Free Exercise Clause, laws that “target the religious
for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’” are subject to strict scrutiny
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B. The RFRA Reaction
This Section discusses Congress’s response to the Court’s decision
in Smith and the expansion of statutory protections for religious
exercise. Section I.B.1 discusses RFRA, enacted to restore protection
of religious freedom to pre-Smith standards. Section I.B.2 discusses
how the Supreme Court has construed and applied RFRA.
1. Accommodating religion beyond the Free Exercise Clause
In 1993, Congress enacted RFRA to overturn the Court’s decision in
Smith.96 RFRA states:
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.97

A person may use RFRA to file a claim against the government, or he
may use RFRA to defend his otherwise unlawful actions.98
Through enacting RFRA, Congress set out to restore the pre-Smith
Free Exercise compelling interest test99 developed in Sherbert100 and
Yoder.101 Congress found that pre-Smith cases provided “a workable test
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests.”102 To determine whether the government
met the compelling interest requirement, Congress expected courts to
look to the pre-Smith Free Exercise precedent in applying this test.103
Further, Congress cautioned courts against construing RFRA as applying
(quoting Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533)); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges were Angels:
Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1189, 1194 (2008) (intimating that the inconsistent application of strict scrutiny is
preferable to lowering the standard of review to rational basis because, unlike strict
scrutiny, applying rational basis “virtually ensures that most free exercise claims will fail”).
96. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2012)).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2).
98. See § 2000bb-1(c) (providing avenues for judicial relief).
99. § 2000bb(b)(1).
100. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text for a
brief explanation of Sherbert v. Verner.
101. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text for a brief
explanation of Wisconsin v. Yoder.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 3 (1993).
103. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8–9; H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (1993).
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a compelling interest test that is more or less stringent than it was prior to
Smith.104 Thus, Congress did not intend for courts to rely solely on Sherbert
and Yoder; rather, it intended for courts to utilize the compelling interest
test as it evolved up to the time of the Smith decision.105
Under RFRA, this compelling interest test only applies where the
federal government has substantially burdened a person’s religious
exercise. RFRA does not require the government to meet strict
scrutiny for every government action that has some incidental burden
on religious exercise.106 Therefore, the threshold question in any case
is: Did the government substantially burden the claimant’s religious
exercise? If not, then RFRA cannot be used to provide a religious
accommodation. Again, Congress expected courts to look to pre-Smith
precedent to determine whether a law or government action
substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise.107
2. The Supreme Court’s current construction
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,108 the Court
held that under RFRA, the government must demonstrate that
applying “the challenged law [to] . . . the particular claimant” serves
the government’s compelling interest.109 Courts must “look[] beyond
104. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 (describing the bill not as a codification of any
decisions reached before Smith, but rather restoring the legal standard applied in those
cases); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (instructing courts not to apply a test that is any more
or less stringent than was used prior to Smith).
105. In the text of RFRA, Congress declared its intent to restore the compelling
interest test used in Sherbert and Yoder. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). In committee
reports, Congress cited subsequent cases to support the finding that the compelling
interest test is workable and strikes a sensible balance between religious liberty and
competing governmental interests. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 5 n.5 (citing Hernandez
v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)). These cases demonstrate Congress’s
approval of both the broad and narrow compelling interest tests discussed in Section
I.A.2. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 684 (upholding the government’s action in denying
members of the Church of Scientology a tax deduction for payments they made to
branch churches for “auditing” and “training” services); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605
(upholding the government’s denial of a tax exemption to a religious college that
claimed its religious beliefs mandated racially discriminatory practices); Lee, 455 U.S.
at 261 (upholding the government’s action in requiring an Amish employer to pay a
portion of Social Security taxes).
106. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 & n.18 (using fire codes, which apply equally to secular
and religious buildings, as an example of neutral and compelling laws and regulations).
107. Id. at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 6.
108. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
109. Id. at 430–31.
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broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of
government mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting
specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”110 In other
words, the government must demonstrate that it has a compelling
interest beyond the mere interest in a uniform application of the law,
and that providing a religious exemption to the particular claimant
would undermine the achievement of that compelling interest.111
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that closely held, for-profit
corporations can exercise religion and that, under RFRA, their
religious exercise is protected.112 In that case, several closely held, forprofit corporations challenged a government regulation promulgated
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act113 that required
certain employers to provide their employees with insurance plans
covering multiple forms of birth control.114 The corporations’ majority
shareholders believed that several of these forms of birth control were
abortifacients,115 and argued that the regulation burdened their
religious exercise by forcing them to “facilitate access to contraceptive
drugs or devices that operate after” conception.116 Applying RFRA, the
Court found that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened
the corporations’ religious exercise.117 The government argued that
the contraceptive mandate did not substantially burden the
petitioners’ religious exercise because providing the coverage would
not itself result in the “sinful” destruction of an embryo.118 An embryo
110. Id. at 431.
111. See id. at 435–36 (distinguishing the present case from others in which the
government demonstrated that permitting exemptions would “seriously compromise
its ability to administer the program”).
112. See 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (2014) (“When first enacted, RFRA defined the ‘exercise
of religion’ to mean ‘the exercise of religion under the First Amendment’—not the
exercise of religion as recognized only by then-existing Supreme Court precedents.”).
113. Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
114. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
115. An abortifacient is “an agent (such as a drug) that induces abortion.”
Abortifacient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abort
ifacient (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
116. See Hobby Lobby, 137 S. Ct. at 2762–66.
117. See id. at 2779 (concluding that the economic penalties imposed by the
regulation of employers who fail to comply with the contraceptive mandate because of
their religious beliefs created a substantial burden on the corporations).
118. See id. at 2777 (summarizing the government’s argument that the connection
between the contraceptive mandate and petitioners’ moral objection to the destruction
of an embryo was “simply too attenuated” to violate the Free Exercise Clause).
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would be destroyed “only if an employee chose to take advantage of
the coverage” and then made an additional choice to use one of the
four methods at issue.119 According to the majority, this reasoning
confused the permissible question of whether religious exercise is
substantially burdened with the impermissible question of whether the
religious belief is reasonable.120 Instead, it held that the narrow
function of the Court in determining whether religious exercise is
substantially burdened is to determine whether the line drawn
between the belief and objectionable act is “an honest conviction.”121
Further, because the government already provided accommodations
to churches and religious nonprofits, the government demonstrated
that it had a readily available least restrictive alternative.122 Thus, the
closely held, for-profit corporations were exempt from the
contraceptive mandate because the government was unable to satisfy
the requirements of RFRA.123
In an attempt to quell the dissent’s fears that its decision will permit
every corporation to become a law unto itself, the majority rejected the
possibility “that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of
race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction.”124
It reasoned that the government has a compelling interest in providing
equal opportunity in the workforce, and Title VII’s prohibition on racial
discrimination is the least restrictive means to achieve that goal.125
Justice Ginsburg dissented on multiple grounds. First, she rejected
the majority’s holding that corporations can exercise religion.126 When
an individual incorporates a business, he separates himself from the
entity to escape personal liability and, therefore, should not be able to
attach his religious beliefs to the corporation’s conduct.127 Second,

119. Id. The four methods of birth control at issue were FDA-approved contraceptive
options that may operate after the fertilization of an egg. See id. at 2762–63.
120. Id. at 2778; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
121. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1982)).
122. Id. at 2782.
123. See id. at 2785.
124. Id. at 2783.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 2793–94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that RFRA “applies to
government actions that ‘substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,’” and
asserting that there is “no support for the notion that free exercise rights pertain to
for-profit corporations”).
127. See id. at 2797 (questioning “why the separation should hold only when it serves
the interest of those who control the corporation”).
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Justice Ginsburg found that the majority misconstrued the substantial
burden analysis.128 The majority’s honest conviction test substituted a
factual finding that the petitioners’ beliefs are sincere and religious for
a legal conclusion that the religious belief is substantially burdened.129
Further, under the proper construction, the government had not
substantially burdened the petitioners’ religious exercise.130 Justice
Ginsburg found that any burden the claimants felt was “too attenuated”
because the government had not required them to “purchase or
provide” the objectionable contraceptives, but only to disperse “money
into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of benefits.”131
Therefore, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, the majority opinion was a bold
departure from pre-Smith jurisprudence because it eliminated RFRA’s
substantial burden prong and expanded the scope of entities protected.132
C. The Inclusive Interpretation of Title VII
As the Supreme Court was expanding protection for religious
exercise under RFRA, it was simultaneously expanding constitutional
protections for LGBT citizens.133 In just twelve short years, LGBT
128. See id. at 2799.
129. See id. at 2798. (acknowledging that the petitioners’ beliefs were sincerely held
but finding them insufficient for a RFRA claim).
130. See id. at 2799.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2791–92.
133. The Supreme Court’s decisions focus on lesbian, gay, and bisexual citizens.
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–08 (2015) (recognizing that the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protect the
right to marry for same sex partners); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003)
(striking down a state law that criminalized homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual
sodomy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). However,
several lower court decisions have held that the Equal Protect Clause requires courts
to apply intermediate scrutiny to government actions that discriminate against
transgender citizens. See, e.g., Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is gender discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is sex-based
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d
566, 568, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the appellant alleged sufficient facts
to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity to bring a claim
of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause). But see Etsitty v. Utah
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
transgender is not a suspect class under Title VII and, therefore, the appellant failed
to allege a sufficient claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
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citizens went from lacking the fundamental right to engage in intimate
same-sex relationships to the right to marry same-sex partners.134
During this brisk shift in the legal and sociopolitical climate, the EEOC
and several circuit courts adopted an inclusive interpretation of Title
VII’s proscription of sex discrimination.135
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee “because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”136 In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,137 the Court held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination prohibits an employer from taking gender into account,
and therefore precludes discrimination against an employee for failure
to conform to sex-stereotypes.138 In other words, Title VII prohibits an
employer from making adverse employment decisions based on the
fact that a female employee fails to act or appear in a stereotypically
feminine way.139 Similarly, it prohibits firing a male employee for
failing to present or act in a stereotypically masculine way.140 Thus, in
Price Waterhouse, an employer violated Title VII when it denied
partnership to a female employee because she failed to behave as some
of the partners believed a woman should.141
In 2012, the EEOC held that discrimination on the basis of
nonconforming gender expression is actionable as sex discrimination

134. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (protecting same-sex marriage); Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 578–79 (protecting same-sex intimate relations).
135. See infra notes 137–144 and accompanying text.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
137. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a), as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014).
138. See id. at 239, 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group . . . .”).
139. See id. at 250 (noting that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”).
140. Though Price Waterhouse concerned a female employee, id. at 231–32, the only
logical inference is that Title VII must also prohibit discrimination against males on
the same basis. Some lower courts have expressly stated this. See Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d
864 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4
(1st Cir. 1999); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000)).
141. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (discussing partner reviews
recommending the company deny partnership because the female employee was too
masculine, and the given advice that the employee walk, talk, and dress more
femininely to improve her chances in the future).
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under Title VII.142 The EEOC acknowledged that discrimination
against a transgender employee might be based on sex stereotypes—
the employer’s belief “that biological men should consistently present
as men and wear male clothing”—but it recognized that this is just one
way to prove sex discrimination.143 The EEOC took guidance from the
Supreme Court’s finding in Price Waterhouse that Congress intended to
forbid employers from taking gender into account at all:
When an employer discriminates against someone because the
person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate
treatment “related to the sex of the victim.” . . . This is true regardless
of whether an employer discriminates against an employee because
the individual has expressed his or her gender in a non-stereotypical
fashion, because the employer is uncomfortable with the fact that
the person has transitioned or is in the process of transitioning from
one gender to another, or because the employer simply does not like
that the person is identifying as a transgender person. In each of
these circumstances, the employer is making a gender-based
evaluation . . . .144

Thus, while the EEOC recognizes that discrimination against
gender-nonconforming employees falls under “sex-stereotyping,” its
decision is much broader than that of the Supreme Court’s in Price
Waterhouse. The EEOC is not alone; the Sixth Circuit recently
abandoned the requirement that a transgender employee demonstrate
sex-stereotyping to prevail on a Title VII claim.145 Instead, the court
relied on Justice Brennan’s finding that Title VII requires “gender [to]
be irrelevant to employment decisions,” and an employer does not treat
gender as irrelevant if an employee’s attempt or desire to change his or
her sex leads to an adverse employment decision.146
Additionally, the EEOC has broadened the sex-stereotyping
framework in holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual

142. See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012).
143. Id. at *10 (considering an employer’s willingness to hire an individual it
believed to be a man but unwillingness to hire the individual after learning she was
now a woman to be sex discrimination as well).
144. Id. at *7 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228, 244).
145. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 571 (6th
Cir. 2018) (“Discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is
necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex . . . .”), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107
(U.S. July 24, 2018).
146. Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240).
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orientation is discrimination based on sex.147 In Baldwin v. Foxx,148 the
EEOC found that sexual orientation cannot be defined without
reference to sex—it is “inseparable from and inescapably linked to
sex.”149 When an employer discriminates based on sexual orientation,
he necessarily treats the employee less favorably because of his sex.150
For example, if “an employer suspends a lesbian employee for
displaying a photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not
suspend a male employee for displaying a photo of his female spouse
on his desk,” the employer took an adverse action against the lesbian
employee that he would not have taken had the employee been
male.151 Thus, as construed, Title VII protects against discrimination
related to a person’s gender expression and sexual orientation.152

147. See Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (E.E.O.C.
July 15, 2015) (“[W]e conclude that sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based
consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is
necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”).
148. Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Several circuit courts have also held that Title VII prohibits discrimination
because of a person’s gender expression and sexual orientation. See, e.g., Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (concluding that
“sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a
subset of sex discrimination”), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1623 (U.S. June 1, 2018);
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (asserting
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is “paradigmatic” sex
discrimination); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883, 883 (11th
Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Glen v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir.
2011)) (reiterating that discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is gender
discrimination under Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir.
2004) (finding that “Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ encompasses both the biological
differences between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is,
discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms” (citing
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). However, not all circuit
courts interpret discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as part of sex
discrimination. See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2017)
(holding discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity, but not sexual
orientation itself, is actionable under Title VII), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2017)
(mem.); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by Title VII),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002) (mem.); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d
Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018)
(holding sex discrimination does not include discrimination because of sexual
orientation). Further, the issue is currently pending before the Eighth Circuit. See
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D. The Inevitable Clash Between Opposing Rights
It was only a matter of time before religious rights and civil rights
clashed.153 In Harris Funeral Homes, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan held that, under RFRA, a closely held,
for-profit corporation was exempt from Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination.154 Thomas Rost, the owner and majority shareholder
of R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., fired the funeral home
director, Aimee Stephens, shortly after she informed him that she
would begin transitioning from male to female.155 The funeral home
had no affiliation to any religious organization.156 However, Rost had
been a Christian for over sixty-five years, and he believed that the
“Bible teaches that a person’s sex (whether male or female) is an
immutable God-given gift and that it is wrong for a person to deny his
or her God-given sex.”157 Further, Rost believed that he would violate
“God’s commands” by permitting a male funeral director to wear a
skirt suit because he “would be directly involved in supporting the idea
that sex is a changeable social construct rather than an immutable
God-given gift.”158 Rost did not deny firing Stephens because of her
transition.159 Instead, he claimed that retaining Stephens as an
employee would violate his, and by proxy the funeral home’s, sincerely
held religious beliefs. Thus, under RFRA, Rost argued that the
government should exempt him from Title VII.160
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Horton, Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Mgmt., LLC,
No. 18-1104 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2018), 2018 WL 1350998.
153. Chief Justice Roberts predicted this clash in Obergefell v. Hodges:
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may
be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for
example, a religious college provides married student housing only to
opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place
children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor General
candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions
would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage . . . . There is little
doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before this Court.
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625–26 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
154. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842
(E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18107 (U.S. July 24, 2018).
155. Id. at 843–45.
156. Id. at 843.
157. Id. at 847–48 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 848 (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 846–47.
160. Id. at 848, 851.
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The district court agreed with Rost.161 First, it found that the EEOC
substantially burdened Rost’s religious exercise.162 The court rejected
the EEOC’s argument that it would only substantially burden the
funeral home’s religious exercise if it required the home to provide
female clothes to Stephens.163 Adhering to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hobby Lobby, the court acknowledged that its function was
not to decide whether the funeral home’s “religious beliefs are
mistaken or insubstantial.”164 Rather, the court could only determine
whether the belief was “an honest conviction.”165 Thus, because the
court found Rost (and by proxy the funeral home) honestly believed
he would violate his religious beliefs by permitting another person to
express their gender identity, RFRA required the court to apply the
compelling interest test.166
The court assumed that the EEOC had a compelling interest in
applying Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to the funeral
home.167 The court did not read the Hobby Lobby dicta on Title VII—
declaring that Title VII serves a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored—as exempting Title VII from the focused analysis RFRA
demands.168 Though the court expressed doubts that the EEOC had met
this burden, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision did not offer

161. See id. at 863.
162. See id. at 856–57 (concluding that it was a substantial burden to require Rost to
employ a biological male who wore clothing that complied with the Funeral Home’s
female dress code).
163. See id. at 855.
164. Id. at 856 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)).
165. Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2279)).
166. As an ad hoc justification of its substantial burden analysis, the court noted
that the funeral home would be forced to pay back and front pay to Stephens for firing
her. Id. (noting the economic and mental pressure that would befall Rost were the
court to apply Title VII after already finding his religious exercise to be substantially
burdened). Further, the court noted that Rost testified that if he were required to
maintain Stephens as an employee, he would feel pressure to sell his business. Id. Yet,
the court based its substantial burden analysis on the mere fact that “requiring the
Funeral Home to provide a skirt to and/or allow an employee born a biological male
to wear a skirt at work would impose a substantial burden on the ability of Rost to
conduct his business in accordance with his sincerely-held religious beliefs.” Id.
167. See id. at 859 (referencing the EEOC’s motion for summary judgment, which
broadly described the compelling interest as “protecting employees from gender
stereotyping in the workplace”).
168. See id. at 856–58 (discussing the more focused inquiry set forth in O Centro and
reaffirmed in Hobby Lobby).
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guidance on how to apply the compelling interest analysis to Title VII.169
Therefore, the court assumed that the EEOC had a compelling interest.170
Next, the court found that the EEOC failed to utilize the least
restrictive method of ensuring that Rost complied with Title VII’s
proscription of sex discrimination.171 The court rejected the EEOC’s
argument that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination was
precisely tailored to ensure employees would not lose their jobs due to
an employer’s gender stereotyping.172 Instead, the court required that
the EEOC show that the burden on the funeral home’s religious
exercise was the least restrictive means of eliminating clothing gender
stereotypes at the funeral home.173 The court found that requiring
Rost to implement a gender-neutral dress code would have burdened
his religious exercise less than requiring him to permit Stephens to
wear a skirt.174 Therefore, RFRA required the court to grant Rost a
religious exemption from Title VII.175
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed.176 First, the Sixth Circuit held that requiring Rost to comply
with Title VII did not substantially burden his religious exercise.177 The
court recognized that it was Rost’s sincerely held belief that the
169. Id. at 859.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 862–63.
172. See id. at 860 (noting that this “conclusory” argument is too broad and does not
focus on the specific burdens on the funeral home).
173. Id. at 859–60.
174. Id. at 862. While there are valid arguments for abstaining from determining
whether the line between the religious belief and objectionable act are reasonable, this
case demonstrates how in some circumstances this leads the court to accept absurd
and arbitrary lines. Rost claimed that permitting Stephens to wear a skirt violated his
sincerely held religious beliefs, and that he would be opposed to allowing a biological
female employee to wear clothing complying with the funeral home’s male dress code;
however, the court noted that Rost already permitted biological female employees to
wear pantsuits without a neck tie. Id. at 863 n.19. While gender norms may certainly
be seen in the Christian Bible, gender expression is a social construct that developed
separate from religion. Thus, it will change as society’s view of acceptable gender
expression changes. Wearing pants is now acceptable for women, yet one hundred years
ago, only men were permitted to wear pants. Granting a religious exemption based on
objection to gender expression authorizes an employer to draw lines less related to
religious beliefs and more properly understood as related to sociopolitical views.
175. Id. at 863.
176. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 590 (6th
Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018).
177. See id. at 586 (concluding that Rost could not use potential customer biases to
assert a substantial burden).
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operation of the funeral home was a religious exercise, and that Rost
honestly believed complying with Title VII would substantially burden
his religious exercise.178 However, the court rejected the notion that it
was powerless to determine whether Title VII substantially burdened
that religious exercise.179 The court reasoned that ending the
substantial burden inquiry after finding an honest conviction would only
substitute the religious objector’s religious belief for legal analysis.180
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that even if requiring Rost to comply
with Title VII substantially burdened his religious exercise, the
government met its burden under strict scrutiny.181 The court found
that the EEOC has a compelling interest in eradicating sex
discrimination, and exempting Rost would undermine that interest by
permitting sex discrimination.182 Further, unlike the district court, the
Sixth Circuit understood the Title VII dicta in Hobby Lobby to mean that
Title VII is always narrowly tailored.183 Thus, the court held that Rost
was not exempt from Title VII.184
E. Traversing the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
The Free Exercise Clause does not stand-alone; it is intrinsically
bound to the Establishment Clause.185 Both clauses operate to secure
religious freedom, but, much like the definition of religion, the
boundaries of the Establishment Clause are elusive.186 At its most
178. See id. at 589.
179. Id. (“We reject a framework that takes away from courts the responsibility to
decide what action the government requires and leaves that answer entirely to the
religious adherent. Such a framework improperly substitutes religious belief for legal
analysis regarding the operation of federal law.” (quoting Eternal Word Television
Network, Inc., v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122,
1145 (11th Cir. 2016))).
180. See id.
181. Id. at 590.
182. See id. at 590, 592–93.
183. Id. at 595.
184. See id. at 600 (granting summary judgment for the EEOC).
185. The text of the First Amendment mentions religion only once, yet both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause refer to it. See U.S. CONST. amend. I
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)
(“The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does
not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”).
186. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4
(2006) (commenting that the Supreme Court appears unable to provide sufficient
guidance for understanding and applying the Establishment Clause).

596

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:569

restrictive posture, the Establishment Clause prevents the government
from advancing or benefiting religion in anyway.187 At its most
permissive posture, the Establishment Clause permits the government
to aid or even favor religion, so long as the government does not
officially establish a national church.188
The Supreme Court’s incoherent jurisprudence stems from
fundamental differences, in the minds of the Justices, of the degree of
separation the Constitution imputes onto the church-state
The varying degrees of constitutionally-required
relationship.189
separation between the government and religion are best represented
by three theories: (1) strict separation, (2) accommodation, and
(3) flexible accommodation.190 The theory of strict separation—best
represented by Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of a “wall of separation
between church and state”—is premised on the understanding that the
Establishment Clause requires the government to remain completely
impartial to religion, providing neither accommodations nor
burdens.191 The accommodation theory on the other hand, is premised
on the understanding that religion does not exist in complete isolation
from the government; the government must provide some aid to
religion just as it must provide aid to other establishments (e.g.,
providing building permits, police, fire engines, etc.).192 Under this
theory, the government may accommodate religion without necessarily
establishing one.193 The flexible accommodation theory contends that
the Establishment Clause simply prohibits the federal government from
establishing a national church, nothing more.194
187. See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text.
189. See Gey, supra note 186, at 12–36 (discussing the shift in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence from strict separation to integration).
190. See Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 507–25 (1990) (discussing differences
between the theories of strict separation, accommodation, and flexible accommodation).
191. Id. at 507–09; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609–10 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Establishment Clause forbids laws that aid religion in general).
192. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675–76 (1970) (explaining that the
Establishment Clause cannot mean the “absence of all contact” between church and
state because “the complexities of modern life inevitably produce some conduct and
the fire and police protection received by houses of religious worship are no more
than incidental benefits accorded all persons or institutions”).
193. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (confirming that the First
Amendment cannot require complete separation but rather requires accommodation
for, and forbids hostility towards, any religion).
194. Rezai, supra note 190, at 521.
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As the Justices have adopted varying views on separation and integration,
the Court has become increasingly divided in determining whether a given
government action violates the Establishment Clause.195 The Court’s
fractured precedent incorporates several common analyses, each premised
on—to varying degrees—the three theories outlined above. For purposes
of this Comment, only three of these analyses are relevant.196
First, under the Lemon test, developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman,197 a
statute “must have a secular legislative purpose”; it must not have a
“principal or primary effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion; and it
“must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”198
Second, under the endorsement test, the government must not have
the primary purpose or effect of endorsing religion over nonreligion.199 The endorsement test is a mutation of the Lemon test that
shifts the focus from whether the government’s primary purpose or
effect is to advance or inhibit religion to whether the government’s
action has the appearance of symbolically endorsing religion over nonreligion.200 According to Justice O’Connor, courts should look
through the eyes of a hypothetical “reasonable observer,” who is
familiar with the “history, language, and administration of a particular
statute” to determine whether the government acted with the primary
purpose of endorsing a religion.201 A statute has the effect of endorsing
195. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (six Justices filing separate opinions).
196. This Comment briefly discusses the Lemon test and the endorsement test to
provide the reader with some general context but focuses mostly on the coercion test
because it serves as the minimum threshold for determining whether government
action violates the Establishment Clause. See infra notes 203–216.
197. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
198. Id. at 612–13.
199. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person’s standing in the political community . . . . Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.”).
200. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989) (“Our subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of
governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion . . . . [W]e have paid
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either
has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion . . . .”), abrogated by Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
201. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also
Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as
endorsing religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid.”).
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religion if it, intentionally or unintentionally, communicates a message
of endorsement or disapproval of religion.202
Finally, under the coercion test, the “government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”203 This test
is best understood as establishing the minimum level of protection that
the Establishment Clause provides; if the government coerces a person
to conform to the beliefs of another, this will satisfy the primary effects
prong of both the Lemon and endorsement test.204 In Lee v. Weisman,205
the Supreme Court held that a public school could not incorporate
clergy-delivered prayer at a graduation ceremony because the prayer
indirectly coerced attendees to participate in a religious exercise.206
The majority decided this case without referring to the Lemon test because,
“at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”207
First, the Court found that the religious exercise “bore the imprint
of the state” because the school’s principal decided to include the
prayer, chose a rabbi to deliver the prayer, and advised the rabbi to
provide a nonsectarian prayer.208 Second, the state’s involvement
placed public pressure on the attendees to at least appear to
202. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that
government practices that offer such an endorsement or disapproval make religion
relevant to community status).
203. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (striking down school-sponsored
prayer without relying on the Lemon test).
204. See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Although our precedents make
clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment
Clause violation, it is sufficient. Government pressure to participate in a religious
activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting
religion.”); see also id. at 618–21 (Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting the argument that
the Establishment Clause only prohibits the government from coercing citizens to
engage in religious activities because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the
government from coercing citizens to support or engage in religious activities and,
therefore, reading the Establishment Clause as only prohibiting coercion essentially
renders the Clause superfluous); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not.”); Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the
Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 483 (1994) (referring to the coercion
standards as a “constitutional safety net”).
205. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
206. See id. at 580, 599.
207. Id. at 587.
208. Id. at 588, 590.
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participate in the prayer, while the graduation setting placed peer
pressure on attendees.209 This peer pressure was enough to indirectly
coerce teenagers to stand for the prayer, thereby appearing to conform
to the religious exercise.210 Further, the fact that the ceremony was
legally voluntary was not sufficient to overcome the coercive nature of
the prayer.211 Graduation ceremonies provide intangible benefits to
high school students, and “[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that
the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights
and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored
religious practice.”212 Thus, the state could not require students to
choose between either appearing to participate in the religious exercise
or forfeiting the intangible benefits associated with graduation.213
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that coercion violates the Establishment
Clause only if it is supported “by force of law and threat of penalty.”214
Incorporating clergy-delivered prayer at a graduation ceremony could not
violate the Establishment Clause because attendance was not legally
required and failure to stand for the prayer was not backed by threat of
penalty.215 If taken to its logical conclusion, this understanding of coercion
would permit virtually all forms of symbolic endorsement.216
At any given time, the Court may utilize any of these tests to scrutinize
an alleged Establishment Clause violation.217 The rest of this Section
explores the relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. Section I.E.1 explores cases in which the Court found a
religious accommodation permissible under the Establishment Clause.218
209. Id. at 593.
210. See id. (noting that “standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view”).
211. See id. at 594–95 (finding no real choice existed for the teenage petitioner who
wished to attend her own graduation).
212. Id. at 596.
213. Id. at 595.
214. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The deeper flaw in the Court’s opinion does
not lie in its wrong answer to the question whether there was state-induced ‘peerpressure’ coercion; it lies, rather, in the Court’s making violation of the Establishment
Clause hinge on such a precious question. The coercion that was a hallmark of
historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of
financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”).
215. See id. at 640–42.
216. See Gey, supra note 204, at 506–07 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the
prayer was constitutional because it was nonsectarian).
217. See id. at 467 (“The case law is littered with tests and guidelines that were
intended to clarify the line separating church and state but which succeeded only in
creating new disputes.”).
218. See infra Section I.E.1.
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Section I.E.2 explores cases in which the Court found a religious
accommodation impermissible under the Establishment Clause.219
1. Playing between the joints
Though the religion clauses of the Constitution share the “common
purpose of securing religious liberty,”220 they are fixed in diametrical
opposition—“both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other.”221 If the government may not advance religion in any way, it
must not provide accommodation from laws that burden religious
exercise, thereby forcing the government to violate the Free Exercise
Clause. On the other hand, if the government is unable to interfere with
religious exercise in any way, it must provide religious accommodations
even where they have the effect of advancing religion, thereby violating
the Establishment Clause. To avoid these logical extremes, the Supreme
Court has made clear that there must be “room for play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”222
The Court has repeatedly confirmed the fundamental principle of
neutrality: to remain within the “joints productive of benevolent
neutrality,” the government may not favor religion over non-religion or
favor one religion over others.223 Neutrality ensures all members of society,
not just those subscribing to the majoritarian orthodoxy, are afforded
religious liberty. The purpose of neutrality, as Justice Brennan noted:

219. See infra Section I.E.2.
220. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
221. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970).
222. Id. at 669.
223. Id. In 1992, Justice Souter recognized that in the preceding forty-five years,
the Court had not strayed from the fundamental principle of neutrality. See Weisman,
505 U.S. at 610 (Souter, J., concurring). Since then, the Court has disregarded the
neutrality principle in only one decision, Town of Greece v. Galloway, which upheld
legislative prayer. See 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014) (rejecting the argument that
legislative prayer must be nonsectarian under historical perspective analysis). There,
the Court rested its decision on the understanding that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer was firmly settled history, beginning with the First
Congress. See id. at 1818–19. Thus, this analysis is not likely to be utilized in the context
of employment discrimination, lest the Court apostatize the Fourteenth Amendment.
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is not only that government may not be overtly hostile to religion but
also that it may not place its prestige, coercive authority, or resources
behind a single religious faith or behind religious belief in general,
compelling nonadherents to support the practices or proselytizing
of favored religious organizations and conveying the message that
those who do not contribute gladly are less than full members of the
community.224

Therefore, while the government must remain neutral between religion
and non-religion, and neutral between religious sects, the First
Amendment does not require the government to completely separate
itself from religion. Rather, so long as it acts neutrally, the government
may accommodate religious exercise.225 Thus, while the Court has moved
beyond strict separation by recognizing that some religious accommodations
are permissible, neutrality serves to temper these accommodations.226
The government remains neutral when it provides relief from a
government created burden on religious exercise, so long as the
availability of that relief is independent of the claimant’s religious
denomination. For example, in Cutter v. Wilkinson,227 the Court rejected
a facial challenge to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),228 which provides prisoners an
exemption from prison policies that substantially burden their religious
exercise.229 The Court held that RLUIPA has the permissible primary
purpose of alleviating government created burdens on religious
exercise.230 Further, RLUIPA did not differentiate between religious
224. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (illustrating how the
purpose and effects prong of the Lemon test ensure government neutrality).
225. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring) (“That government must
remain neutral in matters of religion does not foreclose it from ever taking religion
into account. The State may ‘accommodate’ the free exercise of religion by relieving
people from generally applicable rules that interfere with their religious callings.”).
226. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 669–70 (“Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives
from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has
prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward government
control of churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”).
227. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
228. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012)).
229. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719–20.
230. Id. at 720; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (“Where, as here, government acts
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion,
we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to
secular entities.”).
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sects; exemptions are provided regardless of the objector’s religious
denomination.231 Therefore, at least facially, RLUIPA falls within the
“joints productive of a benevolent neutrality.”232 However, the Court
made clear that inmates should bring an as-applied challenge if
RLUIPA exemptions favor religious interests over others by either
imposing unjustified burdens on other inmates or jeopardizing the
functioning of the prison.233 Thus, a statute must be facially neutral,
and it must remain neutral in its application.
2. Playing outside the joints
The government’s attempt to accommodate religion oversteps the
bounds of neutrality, and thereby violates the Establishment Clause, if
its action has the effect of compelling one citizen to conform to the
religious practices of another.234 It is a fundamental principle that the
First Amendment “gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of
their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own
religious necessities.”235 When the government enacts a statute that
has the effect of forcing non-adherents to conform to the religious
beliefs of another, it places religious interests above all others, and it
has the primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion.236
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,237 the Supreme Court held a
statute that prohibited employers from requiring employees to work
on their Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause.238 Under the
Lemon test, this statute had the effect of advancing religion by imposing
an absolute duty on employers and employees to conform to the
231. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724 (noting that RLUIPA “confers no privileged status on any
particular religious sect, and singles out no bona fide faith for disadvantageous treatment”).
232. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1990); see id. at 720 (“[W]e hold that
§ 3 of RLUIPA fits within the corridor between the Religion Clauses: On its face, the
Act qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation of religion that is not barred
by the Establishment Clause.”).
233. Id. at 726.
234. The fear that the government might force citizens to adopt or participate in a
particular religion is at the heart of the Establishment Clause. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
757–58 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (believing that “the
people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform”).
235. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
236. See id. at 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that
Connecticut’s Sabbath law violated the Establishment Clause).
237. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
238. Id. at 710–11 (majority opinion).
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religious practices of its religious employees.239 The statute took no
account of the employer’s interests or the interests of employees who
did not observe the same Sabbath.240 Specifically, it did not provide an
exception for circumstances under which compliance would impose a
substantial economic burden on the employer or significant burdens
on employees required to work in the place of the Sabbath observer.241
Therefore, the statute placed religious interests over all others.242
Further, even under the endorsement test, the statute violated the
Establishment Clause.243 Although the statute did not have the primary
purpose of endorsing religion, it had the primary effect of endorsing
religion over non-religion and the religion of one employee over the
religions of others who have a different Sabbath.244
The Court has permitted a religious accommodation that had the
effect of compelling a third party to conform to religious beliefs, but
only where necessary to prevent the government from interfering with
a church’s ability to define its religious mission. In Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Crist of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,245
the Court upheld § 702 of Title VII, which exempts churches from
Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination on the basis of
religion.246
The majority noted that an exemption is “not
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion,
which is their very purpose.”247 In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC,248 the Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause require a ministerial exception
to Title VII.249 The Free Exercise Clause protects a church’s right to
shape its own faith and mission through appointing ministers who

239. See id. at 708–09 (emphasizing that, through the law, the state “command[ed] that
Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace”).
240. Id. at 709.
241. See id. at 709–10.
242. Id. at 710.
243. See id. at 711–12 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (applying the endorsement test).
244. See id. at 711 (“The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special and . . . absolute
protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and
practices of other private employees . . . . The message conveyed is one of endorsement of
a particular religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it.”).
245. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
246. See id. at 329–30 (upholding the validity of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012)).
247. See id. at 337 (concluding that a law is invalid if “the government itself has
advanced religion through its own activities and influence”).
248. 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
249. See id. at 188–89.
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“personify its beliefs,” while the Establishment Clause prevents the
government from entangling itself “in such ecclesiastical decisions.”250
Thus, these cases represent a very narrow exception to the rule that
religious accommodation cannot compel third party conformity.
In addition to forbidding the government from compelling third
party conformance, the Court has repeatedly relied on Estate of
Thornton for the proposition that the application of religious
accommodation statutes such as RFRA must not impose unjustified
burdens on third parties251 and for the proposition that religious
accommodations must not override other significant interests.252 In
such cases, the Court easily found that the requested religious
accommodations did not burden any third parties and, therefore, had
no opportunity to set a standard for determining whether such a
burden is unjustified.253 As argued below, the principle of neutrality
prohibits courts from balancing the religious interests of a private citizen
against the religious or secular interests of another. Therefore, the Court’s
reliance on Estate of Thornton for asserting otherwise is misplaced.254
II. ANALYZING THE APPLICATION OF RFRA TO TITLE VII
UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
On its face, RFRA is a constitutional accommodation of religious
exercise because Congress acted with the permissible purpose of
alleviating a burden on religious exercise.255 However, as applied to
250. Id.
251. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(agreeing that RLUIPA required an exemption from prison grooming policy on the
understanding that this exemption would not “detrimentally affect others who do not
share petitioner’s belief”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781
n.37 (2014) (accepting that courts must, in applying RFRA, “take adequate account of
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,” and that
this will inform the compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis of RFRA
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726
(noting that if a facially permissible religious exemption imposed unjustified burdens
on third parties, an as-applied challenge would be appropriate).
252. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (construing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. as
invalidating a law because it “‘unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]’ the interests of Sabbatarians
‘over all other interests’”).
253. See, e.g., id. at 720 (devoting one sentence to declaring that nothing on the face
of RLUIPA “founder[s] on [the] shoals our prior decisions have identified” and
referencing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.).
254. See infra Section II.B.1.
255. See 42 U.S.C § 2000bb (2012) (explaining the purpose of the act is to relieve
substantial burdens imposed by neutral laws of general applicability); Cutter, 544 U.S.
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Title VII, RFRA constitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion.
This Section argues that applying RFRA as construed by the Supreme
Court violates the Establishment Clause in two ways. First, applying
RFRA to Title VII constitutes a government action that coerces LGBT
employees to conform to their employers’ religious beliefs. Second,
RFRA accommodations from Title VII violate the principle of
neutrality and are therefore impermissible endorsements.
A. The Supreme Court’s Construction of RFRA Represents an Extreme
Expansion of Religious Liberty that Coerces Religious Conformance
This Section argues that the Supreme Court’s construction of RFRA
expands the scope of religious accommodations beyond what Congress
intended. Further, applying this construction to Title VII constitutes a
government action that coerces religious conformance. Using Harris
Funeral Homes, this Section argues that the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan accurately applied RFRA as construed by
the Supreme Court, and this application constitutes a government action
that coerced Stephens to conform to Rost’s religious beliefs.
O Centro requires stricter scrutiny than pre-Smith cases
In O Centro, the Court held that the government must demonstrate
that it has a compelling interest beyond the mere interest in a uniform
application of the law. Further, it held that the government must
demonstrate that providing a religious exemption to the particular
claimant would undermine the achievement of that compelling
interest.256 At first glance, this interpretation might not provoke
concern, but upon further inspection, it is apparent that it marks the

1.

at 720 (holding RLUIPA constitutional on its face because Congress acted with the
permissible purpose of alleviating a burden on religious exercise). But see City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my
opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 . . . is a ‘law respecting an
establishment of religion’ that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution. If
the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an art gallery
owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the city ordinances
that forbid an enlargement of the structure . . . . [T]he statute has provided the
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental
preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First
Amendment.” (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55, (1985))).
256. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
435–37 (2006) (distinguishing the case at bar from others in which the government
demonstrated that permitting exemptions would “seriously compromise [the
government’s] ability to administer the program”).
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beginning of a broad expansion of RFRA protection. This compelling
interest analysis seems to align with the text of RFRA, which permits
the government to substantially burden a person’s religious exercise
only if it demonstrates that the “application of the burden to the
person” is in furtherance of a compelling interest.257 Additionally, it
appears in harmony with the purpose of RFRA, as the Court rests its
decision on the reasoning it employed in Yoder, a case specifically
mentioned in the text of RFRA.258 However, leading up to Smith, the
Court was inconsistent in how it applied the compelling interest test to
particular cases.259 For example, in Sherbert, which is also cited in the
text of RFRA, the Court did not require the government to
demonstrate that application of the challenged government action to
the person served its compelling interest.260 Thus, the cases mentioned
in the text of RFRA do not delineate a clear requirement that courts
apply this construction of the compelling interest test. Further, this
construction conflicts with Congress’s expectation that the courts
would rely on pre-Smith precedent as a whole and apply a compelling
interest test that is no more or less stringent than that precedent sets
forth.261 Thus, the Court began its initial expansion of RFRA by
construing it to require this stringent compelling interest analysis as
opposed to the broader analysis also used in pre-Smith cases.

257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
258. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31; see also § 2000bb(b)(1) (explaining that one
purpose of RFRA is “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)”).
259. See Matthew Nicholson, Note, Is O Centro a Sign of Hope for RFRA Claimants?,
95 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1288–93 (2009) (discussing two different compelling interest tests
used by the Court prior to Smith); see also supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
260. In Sherbert v. Verner, South Carolina denied Sherbert unemployment benefits
because she refused to accept employment that would require her to work on her
Sabbath. See 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963). The state argued that it had a compelling
interest in preventing fraudulent claims that burden employers and might reduce the
amount of available unemployment funds. Id. at 407. In considering whether the state
had a compelling interest, the Court never questioned whether the state’s interest was
served by denying the benefits to Sherbert, as the Court in O Centro implies. Compare id. at
408–09 (noting that there was no evidence to suggest that providing religious exemptions
in general would make the benefits scheme unworkable), with O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431
(asserting that in both Yoder and Sherbert, the “Court looked beyond broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”).
261. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text.
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Hobby Lobby eliminates the substantial burden analysis and pits the
rights of corporations against the rights of employees
In Hobby Lobby, the Court expanded RFRA in two ways. First, the
Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations can exercise
religion and that their religious exercise is protected under RFRA.262
In doing so, the Court candidly broke from its practice of deferring to
pre-Smith precedent.263 The Court doubted that Congress meant to
restrict RFRA’s statutory development to an “ossified” version of First
Amendment case law.264 Thus, the Court intentionally established a
new RFRA jurisprudence, untethered to the Constitution.
Second, the Court abdicated its authority to measure the
substantiality of the government’s burden on religious exercise, and
thereby eliminated the threshold question to determine whether
RFRA applies.265 The Court held that its narrow function in
determining whether religious exercise is substantially burdened is to
determine whether the line drawn between the religious belief and
objectionable act is “an honest conviction.”266 In doing so, the Court
repurposed the honest conviction test set forth in Thomas—used to
determine whether a belief is religious—for the substantial burden test
that Congress set forth in RFRA—used to determine if RFRA applies.267
2.

262. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769–75 (2014)
(rejecting multiple arguments for why for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion).
263. See id. at 2772–74 (“HHS argues that RFRA did no more than codify this Court’s
pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents . . . . This argument has many flaws.”).
264. See id. at 2773 (“[T]he results would be absurd if RFRA merely restored this
Court’s pre-Smith decisions in ossified form and did not allow a plaintiff to raise a RFRA
claim unless that plaintiff fell within a category of plaintiffs one of whom had brought
a free-exercise claim that this Court entertained in the years before Smith.”).
265. As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, RFRA distinguishes between
factual allegations that a party’s beliefs are religious—which the court must accept as
true—and the legal conclusion that a party’s religious exercise is substantially
burdened—which the court must decide. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus,
the Court relinquished its authority to draw the necessary legal conclusion to
determine whether RFRA’s protection has attached to a given religious exercise. The
hypocrisy in this analysis should not be lost: while the Court lacks the capacity to
determine the substantiality of the burden on religious exercise, it has the capacity to
determine whether a different government action would be less burdensome.
266. Id. at 2779 (majority opinion) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
267. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. There are, indeed, similarities
between the government’s argument in Hobby Lobby that the contraceptive mandate
does not impose a substantial burden and the reasoning employed by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Thomas to determine that Thomas had not quit his job for religious
reasons. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777, with Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712–13
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This analysis ignores pre-Smith cases in which the Court found that the
government’s burden on religious exercise was incidental or indirect
when it did not require the claimant to participate in the direct act that
violated his religious beliefs.268 By ignoring these cases, the Court
ignored Congress’s expectation that it would use pre-Smith case law to
determine the substantiality of the burden.269 Thus, notwithstanding
Congress’s intent, the Court’s construction of RFRA requires courts to
apply strict scrutiny to every religious claim—so long as the person
honestly believes their religious exercise is substantially burdened.270
By expanding RFRA protections to corporations, the Court effectively
provided exemptions from laws specifically designed to circumscribe
corporate power and protect individuals from harmful corporate
conduct.271 In doing so, the Court has pitted the rights of corporations
against the rights of its employees. And, because it also eliminated the
substantial burden requirement, RFRA will always require courts to apply
strict scrutiny so long as the corporation says that it honestly believes the
government has substantially burdened its religious exercise.272
(discussing the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding that denying Thomas
unemployment benefits was only an indirect burden on his religious exercise).
However, these cases presented the Court with two different questions. In Thomas, the
Court was called upon to determine whether Thomas was exercising religion when he
quit his job, to which the Court held he was, even if the connection between the
objectionable act and his religion seemed unreasonable. See 450 U.S. at 714 (“The
determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a
difficult and delicate task . . . . However, the resolution of that question is not to turn
upon a judicial perception of that particular belief or practice in question; religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment protection.”). In Hobby Lobby, the Court was called upon
to determine whether the religious belief was substantially burdened, to which the Court
abdicated its authority to determine by relying on Thomas. See 134 S. Ct. at 2778–79.
268. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. Though Justice Ginsburg
referred to this precedent to suggest that the Court has the authority to measure the
substantiality of the burden, she failed to distinguish the issue in Hobby Lobby from that
in Thomas. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing
on Bowen as pre-Smith jurisprudence).
269. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s expectations).
270. The word “substantially” was added to clarify which government actions courts
should apply the compelling interest test to. See 139 CONG. REC. 26180 (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (“[RFRA] does not require the Government to justify every action that
has some effect on religious exercise.”). Thus, whether RFRA applies depends on
whether the religious exercise was substantially burdened.
271. See Sepper, supra note 11.
272. Though the government could question whether the belief is sincerely held, it
rarely does so. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and
Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 110
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Moreover, the majority’s dictum on Title VII, suggesting that
Title VII would pass RFRA scrutiny, fails to solidify protection from all
forms of employment discrimination.273 First, this dicta ignores the
O Centro framework, which repudiates broad categorical government
interests and requires the government to show that applying the law to
the person serves its compelling interest.274 Further, unlike race, which
is clearly an immutable characteristic, some judges believe that LGBT
status is a choice.275 Even if courts do not view LGBT status as a choice,
the outward projection of this status is partially within control of the
employee.276 Therefore, rather than requiring the employer to maintain
a flamboyant LGBT employee, a less restrictive alternative is to require
the employee to present in a more hetero-normative or cis-normative
manner. Thus, the government will not satisfy RFRA unless it requires
the LGBT employee to conform to the religious beliefs of his employer
by adopting a religiously-approved lifestyle or appearance.
The district court’s decision in Harris Funeral Homes affirms this
outcome. Section II.A.3 argues that the district court’s decision is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the district court, therefore,
properly provided Rost a religious accommodation from Title VII. Section
II.A.4 argues that, as evidenced by Harris Funeral Homes, granting the
religious accommodation constitutes a government action that compels
LGBT employees to conform to their employer’s religious tenets.277
3.

RFRA mandates religious accommodations from Title VII’s ban on sex
discrimination
The district court’s decision in Harris Funeral Homes, continues the
trend of diverging away from Congress’s intent to establish a pre-Smith
interpretation of RFRA, and is consistent with Hobby Lobby. First, the
district court properly found that the EEOC substantially burdened the
funeral home’s religious exercise because it found that Rost honestly

(2017) (explaining that the government lost in the only two cases in which it
questioned the sincerity of religious belief).
273. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (majority opinion) (making a broad
declaration that “[t]he Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions
on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal”).
274. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
276. Id.
277. See infra Section II.A.4.
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believed the EEOC did so.278 That is precisely what the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby requires.279 After assuming the EEOC
had a compelling interest, the district court properly applied the
narrower least restrictive alternative analysis as set forth in O Centro and
applied in Hobby Lobby.280 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the district court
did not find itself beholden to the Hobby Lobby dicta.281 Rather, it
required the EEOC to demonstrate that it sought the least restrictive
means of enforcing Title VII “to the person,” which the EEOC failed
to do.282 Thus, the district court correctly provided Rost a religious
accommodation from Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit’s reversal diverged from Supreme Court
precedent.283 Though the Sixth Circuit avoided an Establishment
Clause confrontation, for better or worse, its analysis does not apply
RFRA as construed by the Supreme Court.284 First, the court
disregarded the ruling in Hobby Lobby that the narrow function of the
court in determining whether religious exercise is substantially
burdened is to determine whether the line drawn between the belief
and objectionable act is an honest conviction.285 Instead, the Sixth
Circuit found that the district court substituted a religious belief for a
legal conclusion when it ended its inquiry after finding the claimant
honestly believed the government substantially burdened his religious
278. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 855 (E.D.
Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S.
July 24, 2018) (noting that Rost sincerely believes that permitting a biological male
employee to wear a skirt-suit violates “God’s commands” because it supports the notion
“that sex is a changeable social construct,” and therefore holding that requiring Rost to
permit Stephens to wear a skirt-suit would substantially burden his religious exercise).
279. See supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text.
280. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 860 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014)) (noting that RFRA “requires the government
to ‘sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting part[y]’”).
281. Id. at 857 (“This Court does not read that paragraph as indicating that a RFRA
defense can never prevail as a defense to Title VII or that Title VII is exempt from the
focused analysis set forth by the majority. If that were the case, the majority would
presumably have said so. It did not.”).
282. Id. at 860.
283. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 585–90, 595
(6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018).
284. By denying the RFRA defense, the court did not require Stephens to conform to
the religious beliefs of Rost, and therefore did not transgress the Establishment Clause.
Further, the court declined to consider the Establishment Clause arguments raised in
several amici because the parties did not raise these arguments below. Id. at 585 n.8.
285. See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
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exercise.286 This finding mirrors Justice Ginsburg’s rigorous dissent in
Hobby Lobby, and is irreconcilable with the majority’s ruling.287 Further,
the Sixth Circuit relied on the nonbinding Hobby Lobby dicta to assume
that Title VII was narrowly tailored.288 Therefore, even if the EEOC
substantially burdened Rost’s religious exercise, RFRA still did not
provide Rost a religious accommodation from Title VII.289
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not reflect the current
construction of RFRA because the circuit court misapplied the
substantial burden analysis as directed by the Hobby Lobby decision and
it assumed Title VII was the least restrictive means of furthering the
EEOC’s compelling interest. Because the Sixth Circuit disregarded
Supreme Court precedent and misapplied RFRA, the rest of this
section uses the district court’s decision to demonstrate that, in the
context of employment discrimination, applying the Supreme Court’s
current construction of RFRA constitutes a government action that
compels LGBT employees to conform to the religious ideology of their
employer, and thereby violates the Establishment Clause.
4.

Applying RFRA as construed by the Supreme Court constitutes a
government action that coerces LGBT employees to conform
Under the coercion test set forth in Weisman,290 the district court’s
application of RFRA to Title VII in Harris Funeral Homes is a
government action that coerced Stephens to engage in Rost’s religious
exercise. According to the court, Stephens could have her job back
but only if she wore gender-neutral attire.291 Thus, the court required
that Stephens either conform to Rost’s religious beliefs or forfeit her
right to the intangible and tangible benefits of employment. Further,
though Stephens is an adult and may not be so vulnerable as to
succumb to peer pressure to conform,292 RFRA allowed the court to apply
286. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 585.
287. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787, 2792 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that RFRA distinguishes between factual allegations
that a claimant’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature and legal conclusions that
the government substantially burdened religious exercise).
288. See Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 595.
289. Id.
290. See supra notes 205–215.
291. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 863
n.20 (E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No.
18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018).
292. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (relying on the vulnerability of teenagers
to hold that the state could not indirectly coerce teenagers to stand for religious prayers).
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much more than just peer pressure. Permitting Rost to utilize both RFRA
and the federal courts was to permit him to “employ the machinery of the
[federal government] to enforce religious orthodoxy.”293
Additionally, the court’s application of RFRA to Stephens’s Title VII
claim bears the “imprint” of the federal government.294 RFRA does not
say that individuals should conform to the religious ideology of others. It
was the district court’s application of RFRA, as construed by the Supreme
Court, that led to this outcome. In applying the least restrictive alternative
test, the district court determined what degree of conformance RFRA
legally required before Title VII would protect Stephens.295 Once the
district court determined what degree of conformance was required, it
presented Stephens with a choice of conforming to Rost’s religious views
of gender expression or losing her job and all of the tangible and
intangible benefits that go along with it.296 Thus, whether Congress
intended to coerce religious conformance or not, implementing the
statute as construed by the Supreme Court has this effect.297
Further, even under Justice Scalia’s theory of coercion in Weisman, the
district court’s application of RFRA to Stephens’s Title VII claim legally
coerced Stephens to conform to Rost’s religious beliefs.298 The court’s
judgment created both a force of law and a penalty. First, by determining
the least restrictive means to achieve the EEOC’s interest, the court’s
decision acts as a force of law, demarcating the bounds of conformance to
which Rost may legally subject Stephens. Further, the court’s decision
forces Stephens to conform to Rost’s religious beliefs under threat of losing
her job—should Stephens refuse to adhere to Rost’s religious beliefs by
wearing female clothing, Rost may legally terminate her employment.299

293. Id. at 592.
294. Id. at 590 (holding that a public school’s forcing students to stand for prayer violated
the First Amendment’s prohibition against the favoring of one religion over others).
295. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 861–62 (noting that if the EEOC truly
had a compelling interest in ensuring Stephens was not subject to gender stereotypes,
then requiring Stephens to adhere to a gender-neutral dress code is a less restrictive
alternative that serves the EEOC’s interest better than requiring Rost to permit
Stephens to wear a skirt).
296. Id. at 863 n.20.
297. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement
of prayer in public schools.”).
298. See supra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.
299. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 863.
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Thus, even under the most conservative theory of coercion, applying RFRA
to Title VII contravenes the Establishment Clause.
B. Religious Accommodation from Title VII Falls Outside the Joints
Productive of Benevolent Neutrality
The religious accommodations that RFRA carves out of Title VII
violate the principle of neutrality. First, this Section argues that,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s indication otherwise, the
principle of neutrality prevents courts from balancing one citizen’s
religious interests against another citizen’s secular or religious
interests. Therefore, the correct interpretation of Estate of Thornton
admonishes religious accommodations that permit one citizen to
compel or coerce another citizen to conform to his religious tenets.
Using Harris Funeral Homes, this Section argues that a RFRA
accommodation from Title VII violates the principle of neutrality
because it permits an employer to compel a LGBT employee to
conform to the employer’s religious orthodoxy.
1.

The principle of neutrality precludes balancing the interests of third parties
The Supreme Court’s reliance on its decision in Estate of Thornton as
admonishing unjustified burdens on third party interests is
misplaced.300 This interpretation implies that courts have the authority
to balance the religious interests of one citizen against the religious or
secular interests of another. This section argues that any attempt to
balance religious and secular burdens between citizens violates the
principle of neutrality. Instead, the Court should rely on Estate of
Thornton as prohibiting the government from providing religious
accommodations that permit one citizen to coerce or compel another
citizen to conform to his religious beliefs.301
The Court has not had an opportunity to clarify how it will balance the
religious interest of one citizen against the religious or secular interests of
another, but its Hobby Lobby opinion contains enlightening dicta.302 Both
300. There, the Court struck down a statute that compelled secular employers and
employees to conform to the religious beliefs of religious employees. See Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
301. Id. at 710.
302. The Hobby Lobby case nearly presented the Court with the opportunity to clarify
how it will balance these interests when the least restrictive alternative, which RFRA
requires, burdens third parties. By not providing coverage for the contested forms of
birth control, the corporations in Hobby Lobby would have burdened their female
employees’ reproductive choices if this coverage was not otherwise available without

614

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:569

the majority and Justice Kennedy proffer balancing frameworks that fly in
the face of neutrality and the Establishment Clause.303
The majority in Hobby Lobby conceded that in applying RFRA, courts
must “take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”304 Under its view,
however, simply framing a statute as conferring a benefit on third
parties does not preclude an employer from receiving a religious
accommodation.305 Otherwise, the government could render RFRA
inoperable by framing all regulations as benefiting third parties.306 For
example, this would permit the government to require that all
restaurants remain open on Saturdays to give employees an
opportunity to earn tips, and thereby exclude any person whose
Sabbath is on Saturday from owning a restaurant.307 Instead, third
party burdens only guide the compelling interest and least restrictive
means analysis of RFRA.308
Yet, the majority provided no standard for determining which third
party burdens are sufficient to outweigh a claimant’s interest in
religious exercise or which religious interests are sufficient to justify
burdening third parties.309 Simply using third party burdens to guide
the compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses requires
courts to judge the third party’s interests in relation to the objector’s
religious interests. Thus, if the reviewing court ultimately grants a
religious exemption, it favors religious interests over others, thereby
violating the principle of neutrality.310 Additionally, the majority’s
holding that it lacked the capacity to measure the burden on religious

additional cost; but, because the Court ultimately found that the government had a
readily available, less restrictive alternative that did not impact any third party, we are left
with only dicta. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).
303. See supra note 302; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
304. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005)).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id.
308. Id.
309. See id. (noting a less restrictive alternative, which did not burden third parties,
was readily available and being used for other religious entities).
310. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text (explaining that the principle
of neutrality prevents the government from providing religious accommodations that
favor one religion over another, or favor religion over non-religion).
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exercise casts doubt on whether it has the capacity to objectively
balance these interests.311
Though the majority rejected the argument that statutes designed
to confer a benefit on third parties should always preclude religious
accommodation, it did not offer any alternative.312 The majority leaves
open the question of how courts should distinguish between a law that
provides the benefit of working on Saturday from a law that provides
the benefit of equal employment opportunities; or conversely, how
courts should distinguish between religious accommodations that
burden employees by not providing the opportunity to work on
Saturdays, from religious accommodations that burden employees by
subjecting them to discrimination in the work place.313
Justice Kennedy suggests an equally paradoxical framework: a
religious exemption should not be granted where a person’s religious
exercise “unduly restrict[s] other persons . . . in protecting their own
interests, interests the law deems compelling.”314 Under this view, so
long as the third party can defend his own compelling interests, the
judiciary can grant a religious accommodation.315 Thus, this approach
still requires courts to judge a third party’s interests in relation to the
objector’s religious interests, and therefore creates the risk that a court
will violate the principle of neutrality.316 Further, it is unclear how a court
would determine whether an individual has a compelling interest.317

311. See supra notes 265–270 and accompanying text.
312. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (suggesting that prohibiting exemptions
from laws that benefit third parties could render RFRA inoperable, but failing to clarify
how it will balance competing interests because the government had a readily
available, less restrictive alternative).
313. See id. (reasoning that if simply framing a law as benefiting third parties
prevented religious accommodations, the government could require all restaurants to
remain open on Saturdays to give employees the opportunity to earn tips, preventing
persons whose Sabbath is Saturday from operating a restaurant).
314. Id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
315. See id. at 2786–87 (mentioning the Courts’ duty to balance the two interests).
316. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text (explaining that the principle
of neutrality serves to restrain the government from taking a secular stance in terms of
religious affiliation).
317. It is possible that the court would look to whether it has found similar
government interests compelling, but this would ensure certain populations never
have a compelling interest. For example, the Supreme Court has never required the
government to show that it has a compelling interest to justify discriminating against
LGBT citizens or citizens with disabilities. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)
(striking down an amendment to the Colorado state Constitution under rational basis,
which permits the government to discriminate if it has a mere conceivable legitimate
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The Court should not rely on its decision in Estate of Thornton as
admonishing unjustified third party harms, which allows the judiciary
to place its power behind religious interests. Rather, it should rely on
that decision as admonishing religious accommodations that permit
one citizen to compel or coerce another to conform to his religious
ideology. This would shift the Court’s focus in determining whether a
religious accommodation is permissible back to the fundamental
principle upon which Estate of Thornton was predicated: “The First
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their
own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious
necessities.”318 Additionally, this would keep Establishment Clause
restrictions on religious accommodation abreast with Establishment
Clause restrictions on other government actions319 and would prevent
the Judiciary from exceeding its jurisdiction.320
Further, this interpretation would provide a workable solution to
determine how courts should distinguish between a law that provides
the benefit of working on Saturday from a law that provides the benefit
of equal employment opportunities. An employer who closes his
business on Saturday, does not, in pursuance of exercising his religion,
require employees to conform to his religion; these employees are free
to work elsewhere on Saturdays and still keep their job. In the context
of employment discrimination, the employer, in pursuance of
exercising his religion, denies equal treatment unless an employee
conforms to his religious beliefs.321 Thus, while both laws could be
framed as benefiting third parties, courts would only deny religious
accommodations under one law.

interest in discriminating); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1985) (using rational basis to scrutinize government action that discriminated against
citizens with disabilities). Though it might seem strange for an individual to claim his
religion compels him to discriminate against people with disabilities, the court can
neither question the veracity of that claim nor measure the burden on religious
exercise. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2779 (majority opinion).
318. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
319. This accords with the coercion test as set forth in Lee v. Weisman. See 505 U.S.
577, 587 (1992); see also supra notes 203–216 and accompanying text.
320. If the Court violates the principle of neutrality, it violates the Establishment
Clause, and the court is without jurisdiction to issue any decision violative of the First
Amendment. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining the First Amendment
removes the authority to violate the religion clauses from all three branches).
321. See infra Section II.B.2.
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2.

RFRA accommodations permit employers to compel religious conformance
from employees
In Harris Funeral Homes, the district court’s application of Title VII
violated the principle of neutrality because it permitted Rost to compel
Stephens to conform to his religious beliefs. The district court’s
application of RFRA mirrors the statute struck down in Estate of
Thornton because it imposed on Stephens an absolute duty to conform
to Rost’s religious, cis-normative view of gender.322 Unlike the statute
struck down in Estate of Thornton, RFRA does permit the court to
conduct a balancing test; however, this test is only designed to balance
a citizen’s interest in exercising his religion against the government’s
interests in regulating conduct.323 Further, even if RFRA did permit
the court to balance Stephens’s interests, the principle of neutrality
prevents this.324 Indeed, the court did not feign an attempt to account
for the burdens on Stephens.325 Instead, it developed a least restrictive
alternative by looking solely at the EEOC’s compelling interest and
Rost’s religious objection. Rost objected to permitting a male
employee to dress in female clothing, and the EEOC had a compelling
322. See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709 (“In essence, the Connecticut statute
imposes on employers and employees an absolute duty to conform their business
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance
of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates.”).
323. RFRA was designed to protect citizens’ religious exercise from harmful
government action. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8 (1993) (“To assure that all Americans
are free to follow their faiths free from governmental interference, the committee
finds that legislation is needed to restore the compelling interest test.”); H. REP. NO.
103-88, at 2 (1993) (noting that the Constitution has not prevented the government
from burdening religious exercise). Therefore, it sets forth the standard for balancing
the government’s interests in regulating particular conduct against a citizen’s interest
in religious exercise—strict scrutiny. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)(2) (2012)
(requiring that the government have a compelling interest in substantially burdening
the religious objector’s religious exercise, and that it use the least burdensome method
of achieving that interest). It fails, however, to elucidate any standard for balancing
the religious interests of one citizen against the secular or religious interests of
another. See id. (lacking any reference to balancing third party interests).
324. By balancing the religious interests of one citizen against the secular interests
of another, the Court would violate the fundamental principle of neutrality. See supra
notes 223–225 and accompanying text. Thus, even if a court finds that the EEOC has
a compelling interest, it cannot balance third party interests in determining whether
compliance with Title VII is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest
without violating the Establishment Clause.
325. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 861–63
(E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18107 (U.S. July 24, 2018).
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interest in eliminating gender stereotypes.326 Thus, the court’s
solution that Rost reinstate Stephens so long as Stephens adheres to a
gender-neutral dress-code was tailored without any consideration of
the effect this would have on Stephens.327 This solution compels
Stephens to conform to the religious, cis-normative views of gender
expression that were unilaterally designated by Rost and merely
circumscribed by the EEOC’s compelling interest (not Stephens’s). By
providing a religious accommodation that gives Rost the power to
compel Stephens to conform to his religious beliefs, this application of
RFRA exceeds the bounds of benevolent neutrality and therefore
violates the Establishment Clause.328
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s construction of RFRA mandates sweeping
protections of religious exercise at the expense of religious liberty.
This broad interpretation knows no bounds and would require
exemptions for even the most benign burdens on religious exercise.
In particular, the Court’s construction of RFRA presents a serious
threat to the autonomy and liberty of LGBT employees by permitting
employers to blatantly discriminate against them.
Applying RFRA, as construed by the Court, to Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination constitutes a government action that compels
LGBT employees to conform to the religious orthodoxy of their
employers. Providing RFRA accommodations in this context forces an
LGBT employee to choose between conforming to his employer’s
religious hetero, cis-normative views of sexual orientation and gender
expression or forfeiting his job and all the tangible and intangible
benefits it provides.
Further, the compulsion to conform is
attributable to the judiciary, not just the employer, because the
reviewing court determines the degree to which the employee must
conform to keep his job.
Further, RFRA accommodations from Title VII violate the
fundamental principle of neutrality. In granting a RFRA
accommodation from Title VII, courts place religious interests above
all others by permitting an employer to, in pursuit of his religious
exercise, compel his employees to conform his religious beliefs.

326. Id. at 847–48, 859.
327. Id. at 861–63.
328. See supra notes 300–320 and accompanying text.
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Religious exercise is not absolute.329 At all times, the government must
walk the fine line traversing the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
By coercing LGBT employees to conform to the religious orthodoxy of
their employer, RFRA moves beyond the zone of permissible
accommodation into the realm of impermissible religious endorsement.

329. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.

